These views, postulating the emergence of a new economic regime, have been falsified by subsequent developments in economic policy and of trends in the economy. In presenting his next budget in 1986 the Finance Minister, V. P. Singh, claimed that his priorities were 'to strengthen the public sector', 'to provide a further thrust to anti-poverty programmes ' and 'to provide relief to the common man'. The Budget proposed to increase Plan outlays by 20.5 per cent and to increase expenditure for anti-poverty programmes by 65 per cent, though critics pointed out that even after this increase these programmes would represent less than three per cent of all Plan outlays [Kurien 1986 ]. And even though, as the Far Eastern Economic Review reported 'In the main. . . the 1986-87 budget carried on the tax rationalising initiative begun in the previous year . . . (it also) . . . introduced a modified value-added tax scheme, designed to provide a finer-tuned instrument of fiscal control over industrial development ' [July31, 19861. The Economist regretted what it saw as evidence of a failure to carry liberalïsatïon forward, which it thought was due to the government's having given in to political pressures (March 8, 1986) . It was claimed in 1985 that the most important part of the purpose of the tax concessions that were introduced was to improve receipts by better compliance, and it is true that there was an increase in receipts from personal income tax of 24.3 per cent in 1985-86 (though the rate fell in the following year, so that it once again lagged behind the growth of money incomes of those liable to income tax [EPW March 7, 1987:387] ). In spite of increased receipts from direct taxation in 1985-86, the imbalance between direct and indirect taxation deteriorated further in the 1986 budget, and the estimated deficit increased yet again. A critic wrote:
The government appears to be unable to generate 31 Developments in India's Economic Policy
The first budget of Rajiv Gandhi's premiership in 1985 was hailed by some as marking the inception of a new economic regime. It reduced income, corporate and wealth taxes, cut import duties on capital goods, provided tax breaks to exporters and largely eliminated licensing restrictions on investments in 25 main industries (including machine tools, industrial machinery, electrical equipment and electronic components). The philosophy of the budget was to help the private sector, and growth in public sector expenditure was to be kept to the lowest level for many years. Allocations for rural employment and related anti-poverty programmes were to be relatively reduced. Nonetheless a record budget deficit was forecast, though it was asserted that this would not be inflationary in view of the favourable positions both of foodstocks and of foreign exchange reserves.
Supporters and critics alike saw in these measures a radically new approach in economic policy, which seemed to extend the general tendency of economic 'liberalisation' to India -though the policy changes proposed were in fact foreshadowed in India's negotiations with the ¡MF for Special Drawing Rights in 1981. TheEconomist, naturally sympathetic to what it saw as a move towards the freeing of markets, said that 'Mr Rajiv Gandhi's first budget tackles the red tapes and draconian taxes introduced by his mother and his grandfather which have hindered growth in the Indian economy.. . The liberalisat ion is not complete But (the changes) take India a big step away from the days when bureaucrats rather than businessmen decided its investment plans' [March 23, 1985] Kurien's own answer to the question he poses is that in spite of its professed identification with the poor, the government has in its fiscal policy exercised an option in favour of the relatively small affluent class. The share of direct taxes in the total tax revenue of the central government has declined, according to the LFTP, as has the share of income tax, and the government has claimed that the economy has reached its tax ceiling. On the other side, through its public expenditure and increased reliance on internal borrowing, the government has made a direct contribution to the affluent sector. It is of course not true that all of those who are employed in the public sector are 'affluent', but some of those who pay direct taxes are government employees; and it is known that a part of the direct and indirect effect of government expenditure accrues as incomes to those who are already affluent -like the larger farmers who are in the best position to benefit from fertiliser subsidies, export traders and contractors. The members of the 'affluent class' benefit from lending to the government through the banks. Public expenditure has not been raised because of increased allocations for poverty alleviation, when these programmes claim less than three per cent of Plan expenditure. The deficit is part of an attempt to stimulate economic activity, but not of the type where deficit financing is used to put people to work to produce labour intensive infrastructural items. Here '. . . the aim has been to stimulate the production of certain kinds of industrial goods (consumer durables) for which the demand could simultaneously be generated by the type of additional incomes created through increased public expenditure . . The essence of the new fiscal strategy is to make the island of affluence, or the upper crust of the economy, a largely self-serving segment' [Kurien 1987:645] . increase the tax-take and thus their power to spend where and on whom they want . . . Mr Gandhi the politician feels that he must keep doling out the cash. Three of his main reforms -fewer import controls, a cut in income tax rates and the introduction of a value-added tax -are designed to pull in more revenue rather than reduce the role of government in the economy'.
Radical Indian economists like C. T. Kurien, cited earlier, or Sanjay Baru [1985] concur with some of this. They see budget deficits as a reflection, as much or more, of the inability of the state to raise resources as of its inability to control expenditure. Baru wrote of the 1985 Budget that '. . . to the extent that increased expenditure has to be incurred, the inability of the state to raise matching resources to meet even (the truncated expenditure planned in the Budget) represents "the fiscal crisis of the state". He too saw this being used as an argument for the rolling back of the role of the state in the economy, but suggested that this approach does not get at the root of the problem, which has been the inability of the state to raise revenues. The fiscal trends of the last two years seem to prove him right.
Let us amplify these arguments. In 1947, and in the years immediately after Independence, the Congress government, because of the role of the Congress in the Freedom Struggle and the prestige of its (at that time) truly national leadership, was relatively strong in relation to society. But the regime was also divided ideologically between those with socialist views, conservatives sympathetic to the big bourgeoisie and to the idea of market regulation of the economy, and Gandhians. Under Nehru's leadership, undisputed after the death of Patel, the regime embarked on an ambitious programme of planned economic development, but in the context of a formally democratic political system in which the need to accommodate a range of different views and pressures was apparent. In the middle l9SOs, in the Second Five Year Plan, a programme for autonomous industrialisation was undertaken, aimed at breaking away from the international industrial division of labour inherited from colonialism, and at the expansion of the economic space of Indian capital [Prabhat Patnaik's formulation, 1986]. The undeveloped industrial structure of India was indeed transformed by the middle 1960s, and high industrial growth rates were achieved. The programme was carried through in the face of strong opposition both internally and externally (and it was watered down as a result), and it has subsequently been fashionable to criticise this industry-led, import substituting and 'urban biased' strategy for development [Mellor 1976; Lipton 1977] .
The extent of the achievement must not be discounted therefore [see, for example, Balsubramanyam 1985:112] , nor the economic logic of the hostility of Western, especially US capital to it, and the favouring of 'liberalisation' [see Patnaik 1986] . Arguments about the limitations of the Mahalanobis model on which the Second Plan was based, should not be confused with the consequences of the political context in which it was introduced [Sutcliffe 1971 ]. The drive for autonomous industrialisation faltered, however, and the effort to plan economic development foundered in the mid-1960s. Toye [1981] showed that the deceleration of industrial growth from that time was not a general phenomenon but one concentrated in the capital goods industries and to a lesser extent in intermediate goods. The abandonment of the policy of state promoted capital accumulation, which characterised the Second and Third Five Year Plans, caused the slow-down in industrialisation. Why did this shift in policy take place? There is a good degree of consensus amongst economists that it was most crucially the result of the inability of the government to raise resources domestically at the expense of property incomes, in a context in which the Congress party had an increased need for legitimacy. By the middle 1960s the state was unable to sustain increased development expenditure because of a fiscal crisis, arising from increased non-developmental expenditure commitments combined with an inability to raise more resources domestically, and consequent heavy dependence on regressive indirect taxation, on deficit financing, and on foreign aid.
The crisis of the Third Plan in the early 1960s, with stagnation in agriculture, shortages of power and essential raw materials, increasing prices, andcrucially -yawning budgetary deficits, led to increasing pressures for reductions in plan outlays and for greater reliance on the private sector. By-election reverses in 1963 showed how the opposition could harness discontent and continued the undermining of Nehru's prestige, withered by the China War of 1962. A series of ideological and policy battles ensued as Nehru sought to reaffirm the commitment of Congress to democratic transformation. But with his death the change in the means and objectives of public policy which was being actively pursued by Congress conservatives such as Morarji Desai even in the later part of Nehru's lifetime, was soon completed. Shastri lacked an independent power base and, giving in to both domestic critics and to criticisms by international aid-giving agencies'. . . of overly ambitious industrial plans in the public sector and inefficient methods of development both in agriculture and in industry that ignored incentives to private (domestic and foreign) investment' [Frankel 1978:246] , he allowed a reorientation of the approach to the economy. The
Planning Commission was effectively displaced as a policy-making body; there was a shift from controls to incentives as major instruments of development planning; and an enlarged role for private domestic and foreign investment was encouraged. Shortly after Shastri's death, and before Indira Gandhi had fully taken control of the reins of government, the power of international capital and the direct influence of the US government was shown in the 1966 devaluation, which was strongly opposed within India.
After the middle 1960s, what Shetty describes as 'structural retrogression' took place, shown by the facts (amongst others) that services have grown faster than commodity producing sectors; that the growth of basic and capital goods industries has been slower than the meagre average growth in industrial output; and that the production of mass consumption goods has lagged behind that of elite oriented consumer goods. All these tendencies have been accentuated in the 1 980s. At the same time there is evidence ofa great deal of under-utilised capacity, and there has been no growth in organised sector employment (latterly, indeed, the proportion of the labour force engaged in the organised sector has actually been reduced [EPW, February 28, 1987:346] ).
Shetty argues that structural retrogression is the result of the decline of planning -referring to the twin phenomena of the reduction of rigorous industrial controls (which he shows to have given rise to distortions in production and investment patterns in the private sector), and of serious financial mismanagement, which is shown both in the frittering away of a significant proportion of public-sector outlays in non-developmental expenditure, and in the distorted system of resource mobilisation. These result in large measure from the political pressures of federalism and the power of 'bullock capitalists' (the Rudolphs' evocative term) and landlords both to resist taxation and to mulct public sector resources through cancellations or reductions of electricity charges and of debts to formal credit institutions. The increasing significance of transfers to state governments for purposes other than development and capital formation reflects the increasing pressures exerted by states on the centre, already apparent by the early 1960s, as Hanson showed [1966] . Transfers to state governments include allocations for famine relief assistance, for example, of which the Seventh Finance Commission'. . . implicitly brought out that the relief expenditure encouraged by the centre was largely determined by political patronage extended to a few states' [Shetty 1978:223] . Financial relations between the centre and the states in the early 1980s were in a chaotic state. Why, for example, should Maharashtra, with a population of 55 mn, have been awarded a plan outlay of Rs 15,000 mn while Uttar Pradesh, with twice that population, received only Rs12,500 mn, or West Bengal with the same population received only Rs5,000 mn? Shetty builds up a picture of enormous wastage of financial resources, whilst showing at the same time that the system of resource mobilisation has been distorted because of(i) the government's refusal to touch the richer segments of the farm community; (ii) reductions in the marginal tax rates on personal incomes and wealth in the non-farm sector; (iii) its continued reliance on indirect taxes which are regressive; and (iv) its resort to a disproportionate amount of deficit spending [and see Shetty's summary;
Shetty's analysis of public policy and its impact shows that the same basic constraints that were crucial in the period up to the mid-I 960s -the inability of the state to raise sufficient resources domestically through direct taxation of property incomes; the failure of agrarian reforms; and the serious market constraints which have been exacerbated still further by regressive taxation -have persisted in the period since then, and have even been intensified by the relaxation of attempts to control and to plan the economy. His explanation for 'structural retrogression' is that it has come about because of 'the decline of planning', but this only leads us to ask the further question of why planning should have declined. The crisis of planning came about in the 1960s because of resource constraints and failures in the implementation of plans up to that time which resulted, amongst other factors, from the power of the rural rich to resist taxation and to turn measures of agrarian reform to their own advantage, and from the power, especially, of big business similarly to turn industrial controls and to resist taxation. Fundamentally the failure of planning came about because of the dependence of the Congress government, for its control of the state, upon the classes which would have had to sacrifice most for planning to succeed. The failures of planning became self-reinforcing because, as plan targets were not fulfilled, discontents increased and were given political expression in the rise of opposition. Following from these observations, state power may be seen as lying in an uneasy alliance between the big bourgeoisie and the dominant rural class, and it is this compromise of power which finally underlies the structural constraints that have affected Indian economic development, expressed in fiscal weakness.
Theories about India's Political Economy and The Explanation of Recent Developments
The principal alternative to the view of Indian political economy presented thus far is found in the work described as 'the new political economy', within the neo-classical paradigm, which'. . . has been based on empirical studies of government intervention in trade and industry and the varied effects that such policy actions in India have had ' [Toye 1988] . Empirical studies by Bhagwati and his collaborators sought to 36 show how exchange controls leading to the overvaluation of the rupee, and bureaucratically discretionary methods of restricting imports and sanctioning investments in industry, led to economic distortions and inefficiency. The'. . . origin of the new political economy was in the implications that were drawn out of their economic analysis of the consequences of bureaucratic controls ' [Toye 1988]. Essentially what is argued is that India is a 'rentseeking society' -or more accurately that India is a society with a rent-seeking government: '. . . the misguided adoption of certain economic policies, especially import quotas, itself creates a society with certain economic irrationalities such as permanently under-utilised industrial capacity, a corrupt administration and a political structure dominated by interests fed financially by windfall gains (from bureaucratic rents, based on the system of controls). This latter feature is important because, almost by definition, it rules out the possibility of achieving the reforms which the neo-classicials are seeking, at any rate in a democratic polity like India ' [Toye 1988] . Recognising the insights in this argument, whilst also being aware of its limitations in terms of the specification of political dynamics, Bardhan [1984] has brought this explanation together with the conception of the Indian state as 'a duopolistic arrangement between the rural oligarchy and the industrial bourgeoisie' [Mitra] which informs the account of India's political economy offered above.
Bardhan's argument is that the trends of Indian economic development can be explained as the There is a complex net of transfers and payments between 'sectors' which no-one has adequately sorted out quantitatively. But what does seem to stand out is that compromises are being made all the time between the interests of different groups of rural people and those of the industrial bourgeoisie and the working Blair 1980] , as a result both of the kind of fiscal crisis depicted by Shetty, and the inability of the system to supply sufficient resources to meet divergent demands, and of Indira Gandhi's attempt to centralise power by destroying the local organisation of the Congress. The period ofJanata rule saw first, relief of the pressures of managing legitimacy, and then their renewal in a context in which 'bullock capitalists' were more strongly represented at the centre than before.
They were relieved again by Indira Gandhi's triumphant return to power in January 1980, and yet again by the support generated by Rajiv after her But though there were, and remain, powerful groups with interests in effective liberalisation, it has become clear that others are threatened by the possible removal of the system of controls from which they have benefited by being able to manipulate it, by direct competition from imports, or by indirect competition mediated by shifts in demand away from old goods to new ones. And events have shown that the regime is unable to resist the political pressures which have created and perpetuated India's basic fiscal problems.
So there has been a fudge, and the underlying tendencies, towards increasing public expenditure, increasing imbalance in taxation, and increasing resort to commercial borrowing, have been intensified in practice. The move to 'liberalise' the economy was perhaps even half-hearted in intention. 
